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IS THERE AN EMERGING FIDUCIARY DUTY TO
CONSIDER HUMAN RIGHTS?
CYNTHIA A. WILLIAMS ∗
JOHN M. CONLEY ∗*

I. INTRODUCTION
According to the majority of corporate law professors in the United States, a corporation’s
primary, and possibly exclusive, goal is to maximize shareholder wealth within the confines of
the law. This academic view of the corporation leads directly to the conclusion that corporate
governance structures and boards’ fiduciary duties should be arranged to provide direct
accountability to shareholders and only to shareholders. 1 Given this understanding of the
corporate purpose, much academic commentary and debate has focused on the extent to which
boards of directors of public companies may make decisions that advance the interests of
stakeholder groups other than shareholders, such as decisions that advance the interests of
employees, communities, consumers, or the environment, perhaps even to the detriment of
shareholders. 2 This Article focuses on one particularly compelling non-financial consideration,
the effect of a corporation’s activities on human rights, to illustrate a variation of the more
general questions of when must the directors of a public corporation consider other constituents
and why.
In many senses, the shareholder-stakeholder debate has always been “merely” academic,
since the complex realities facing corporate decision makers will often necessitate making
decisions that have potential impacts on many stakeholders including employees, consumers,
suppliers, debt holders, option holders, governments, business partners, and local communities.
As a matter of business necessity, thoughtful boards and managers consider that wide range of
Stakeholder interests in order to make intelligent decisions to enhance the long-term value and
success of the corporation. 3 Indeed, recent proxy statements by major U.S. companies describing

∗

Professor of Law, University of Illinois College of Law
* William Rand Keenan Professor of Law, University of North Carolina.
1
For one formulation of this view, see Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for
Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L. J. 439 (2001).
2
See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV.
247, 253-54 (1999) (arguing that, given the understanding of the corporation as an instance of economic
“team production,” the function of the board is to be a mediating hierarchy and not to prefer the interests of
one input (shareholders) to the exclusion of the others in all instances).
3
See The Good Company (special report casting a critical eye on corporate social responsibility movement),
ECONOMIST, Jan. 22, 2005, at 11 (“[F]or strictly selfish reasons, well-run companies will strive for friendly
long-term relations with employees, suppliers and customers. There is no need for selfless sacrifice when it
comes to stakeholders. It goes with the territory.”).
∗

the qualities they look for in directors explicitly mention the ability to make decisions balancing
the interests of various constituencies. 4
As a matter of doctrine, the business judgment rule has always given boards wide discretion
to make decisions that advance other stakeholders’ interests, even at the expense of shareholders. 5
This rule applies even when it means leaving money on the table with respect to a takeover bid, 6
which is when target shareholders’ short-term wealth-maximizing interests most diametrically
conflict with a stakeholder-infused or longer-term perspective. Under rare circumstances,
directors may have a legal duty under Revlon v. MacAndrews to maximize short-term shareholder
value. 7 Revlon has been construed narrowly by later Delaware Supreme Court opinions, 8
however, and “Revlon claims” are almost never successful. 9
Leaving those rather substantial practical realities and doctrinal powers aside, boards’ current
fiduciary duties to their shareholders require them to consider the rights and interests of
stakeholder groups, including those rights and interests exemplified in the international law of
human rights. This Article will concentrate on three reasons why boards’ fiduciary duties require
consideration of international human rights: (1) the growing importance of Alien Tort Claims Act
litigation (discussed in Part III); (2) changing institutional investor behavior (Part IV); and (3)
developing public-private governance regimes (Part V), as illustrated by the United Nations
Global Compact. To appreciate the context of these developments, this Article will start in Part II
by sketching the changes occurring today in the social expectations of global business.

4

For instance, General Electric Company states the following:

The board of directors is elected by the shareowners to oversee management and to assure that
the long-term interests of the shareowners are being served. Both the board of directors and
management recognize that the long-term interests of shareowners are advanced by responsibly
addressing the concerns of other stakeholders and interested parties including employees,
recruits, customers, suppliers, GE communities, government officials and the public at large.
Michael R. McAlevey, General Electric Board of Directors and Audit Committee Practices, 1455 P.L.I.
599 (2004). See also Citigroup, Inc., available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/
data/831001/000119312505051100/ddef14a.htm (seeking candidates that, among other qualities, “will
effectively, consistently and appropriately take into account and balance the legitimate interests and
concerns of all of Citigroup’s stockholders and our other stakeholders in reaching decisions, rather than
advancing the interests of a particular constituency”).
5
See Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968) (refusing to require corporate owner of
Wrigley Field to install lights so the Chicago Cubs could play games at night, notwithstanding plaintiffs’
argument, which defendants did not deny, that the reason the Cubs’ owners would not upgrade to allow
night games was because of their view of the deleterious effect on the surrounding community).
6
See Paramount Comm., Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990).
7
See Revlon v. MacAndrews, 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986) (holding that when the break-up of a company is
inevitable, or the company is involved in a change of control transaction, then the duty of the board of
directors is to get the highest price possible for the shareholders).
8
See Paramount Comm., Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d at 1150 (upholding the chancellor’s conclusion as a
matter of law that when control is in a “fluid aggregation of unaffiliated shareholders” before a transaction,
i.e., in the market, and will be in a “fluid aggregation of unaffiliated shareholders” after a transaction, that
is not a change of control transaction implicating Revlon); Paramount Comm., Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc.,
637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1993) (holding that a transaction shifting control unaffiliated shareholders to a majority
shareholder is a change of control transaction implicating Revlon duties).
9
See Robert B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, The New Look of Shareholder Litigation: AcquisitionOriented Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 133, 195 tbl.15 (2004) (finding that in 1999 and 2000, 233
complaints in Delaware raised Revlon claims, and none was successful).
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Before beginning, one further explanatory paragraph is in order. We have stated that boards
are currently “required” to consider the rights and interests of other constituents, but, as will
become clear below, in only one instance is this a requirement of law, and that is when examining
the interaction of potential Alien Tort Claims Act litigation and corporate fiduciary duty law. The
“requirements” to consider institutional investor activism on stakeholder issues are market
requirements, and the “requirements” to meet the standards of developing public-private
governance regimes are norms-based requirements. Certainly, there is a difference, then, in how
we are using the word “requirement” in these three instances. The more interesting question is
how far apart these “requirements” are. “Legal” requirements presume potential enforcement in
court, while market- and norms-based requirements presume enforcement by other means (such
as shareholder disinvestment, bad publicity, consumer boycotts, and the risk of regulatory
interventions to create new legal requirements). Yet, legal and non-legal enforcement
mechanisms interact. The extra-legal “enforcement” brought about by risks to companies’
reputations and therefore to the value of their brands from highly-publicized problems with
stakeholders or human rights issues may, in many instances, be stronger and thus more effective
mechanisms of enforcement than the risks of actual liability in a court proceeding. 10 Many of the
reasons that businesses are changing their approaches to these issues are not liability driven, but
are market- and norms-driven. The existence of potential legal claims may heighten the efficacy
of non-legal enforcement mechanisms because it may be more stigmatizing for a company to be
hauled into court for alleged human rights abuses than to be pilloried in the press as part of a nongovernmental organization (NGO) campaign. Yet, the difference between the strength of each of
these potential enforcement mechanisms is narrowing, given the developments discussed below,
and so, by implication, is the difference between our various uses of the word “requirement.”

II. SOCIETY’S CHANGING EXPECTATIONS OF BUSINESS
For a number of reasons, society’s expectations of business have become more demanding over
the past decade. 11 One reason is the maturing of the environmental movement, including the
current salience of “sustainability” as a management concept. 12 Given the proliferation of
environmental laws in the last three decades, 13 particularly in the United States, companies have
increasingly hired an environmentally knowledgeable workforce, who can then become “change
agents” within the organization. 14 Another reason is the increasing power of NGOs to mobilize
resources, to frame issues of corporate responsibility, and to collaborate as partners with
companies in order to address difficult social and environmental issues. 15 A third reason is the
10

See infra notes 11-28, 97-117 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., ECONOMIST, supra note 3, at 3 of Special Report (“Over the past ten years or so, corporate
social responsibility (CSR) has blossomed as an idea, if not as a coherent practical programme. CSR
commands the attention of executives everywhere . . . .”).
12
See Pratima Bansal, Evolving Sustainably: A Longitudinal Study of Corporate Sustainable Development,
26 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 197, 210 (2005) (explaining “why firms commit to sustainable development and
the reasons that commitment changes over time”).
13
See Vernon M. Buehler & Y.K. Shetty, Motivations for Corporate Social Action, 17 ACAD. MGMT. J.
767, 769 (1974) (noting “increasingly numerous federal, state, and local regulations” as the second mostoften identified reason for companies’ increased social involvement, the first being “enlightened self
interest,” i.e., the importance to companies of healthy communities, well-educated citizens, and stable
political systems).
14
See Pratima Bansal & Kendall Roth, Why Companies Go Green: A Model of Ecological Responsiveness,
43 ACAD. MGMT. J. 717, 728 (2000) (“Firms motivated by environmental responsibility often pointed to a
single individual who had championed their ecological responses.”).
15
See Petra Christmann & Glenn Taylor, Globalization and the Environment: Strategies for International
11
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growth of the socially responsible investor movement and activist pension fund investors. Many
of these investors are calling on companies to address long-term risks such as climate change or
international human rights 16 Fourth, consumer pressures establish heightened expectations in
certain industries, such as in the food industry in Europe, where consumers press toward higher
safety and quality standards. 17 Fifth, the anti-globalization movement that burst forth in Seattle
in 1999 caused corporate leaders to realize that they need to defend the underlying premises of
globalization and corporate-driven economic development. 18 Finally, in some industries, highprofile, negative events triggered rapid shifts in industry norms, such as the explosion of a Union
Carbide Corporation plant in Bhopal, India, which accelerated the chemical industry’s
establishment of the Responsible Care Initiative creating benchmarks for safety in that industry.
19

An example of some of the effects of these changing social expectations can be seen in the
Chiquita Company, one of Cincinnati’s premier companies. In the early 1990s, Chiquita was
battered by bad press in the United States about environmental practices on its banana farms in
Latin America. 20 Socially responsible investors began asking questions about the issue, and
Chiquita’s environmental managers led internal efforts to convince the board to change the way
the company was handling the issue. To respond to these pressures, Chiquita turned to an
established NGO, the Rainforest Alliance, and together they developed the Better Banana “Seal
of Approval” to certify improvements in workers’ health and safety, reduce emissions into the
water, and preserve the rainforest. 21 As the partnership developed, Chiquita’s social goals became
Voluntary Environmental Initiatives, 16 ACAD. MGMT. EXECUTIVE 121, 122 (2002) (“In the last ten years,
the ability of NGOs to exert global influence on firm conduct has increased tremendously.”); Stuart L. Hart
& Mark B. Milstein, Creating Sustainable Value, 17 ACAD. MGMT. EXECUTIVE 56 (2003) (discussing
development of partnerships between companies and NGOs).
16
See Gordon L. Clark & Tessa Hebb, Why Do They Care? The Market for Corporate Global
Responsibility and the Role of Institutional Investors (2004) (unpublished paper, on file with the University
of Oxford School of Geography and the Environment) (providing theoretical model of why institutional
investors have become concerned with human rights and global social responsibility issues); Sandra
Waddock, The Multiple Bottom Lines of Corporate Citizenship: Social Investing, Reputation, and
Responsibility Audits, 105 BUS. & SOC’Y REV. 323, 330-33 (2000) (describing various kinds of social
investing, and California Public Employees’ Retirement System leadership on corporate governance and
social issues).
17
See Rachel Schurman, Fighting “Frankenfoods”: Industry Opportunity Structures and the Efficacy of the
Anti-Biotech Movement in Western Europe, 51 SOC. PROBS. 243 (2004) (discussing how anti-geneticallymodified (GMO) food activists used the increasing sensitivity of European consumers to food safety issues
to advance the anti-GMO agenda).
18
See Bennett Freeman et al., A New Approach to Corporate Responsibility: The Voluntary Principles on
Security and Human Rights, 24 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 423, 424 (2001) (discussing the impact
of the anti-globalization movement on companies’ views of the importance of responding to increased
social expectations).
19
See Thomas P. Lyon, ‘Green’ Firms Bearing Gifts, 26 REGULALTION 36 (2003) (discussing the
relationship between Bhopal and the development of the Responsible Care Initiative).
20
This skeletal recitation of facts is taken from interviews we have conducted with Chiquita managers as
part of an empirical project on the corporate responsibility movement, and on a conference presentation by
Chiquita Senior Director of Corporate Responsibility and Public Affairs George Jaksch in London,
February 2005, discussing its partnership with the Rainforest Alliance. See John M. Conley & Cynthia A.
Williams, Engage, Embed & Embellish: Theory Versus Practice in the Corporate Social Responsibility
Movement, 31 J. CORP. L. (forthcoming 2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=691521. For a complete account of the transformation at Chiquita, see J. GARY
TAYLOR & PATRICIA J. SCHARLIN, SMART ALLIANCE: HOW A GLOBAL CORPORATION AND
ENVIRONMENTAL ACTIVISTS TRANSFORMED A TARNISHED BRAND (2004).
21
See TAYLOR & SCHARLIN, supra note 20, at 25-26, 32-36.
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more extensive (perhaps as cultural changes occurred within the company). 22 In 2001, Chiquita
signed an agreement with the International Union of Food, Agricultural, Hotel, Restaurant,
Catering, Tobacco and Allied Workers’ Associations (IUF), and the Latin American Coordinating
committee of Banana Workers’ Unions (COLSIBA) guaranteeing freedom of association and
minimum labor standards, including a recognition of Chiquita’s responsibilities to provide safe
and healthy work environments. 23 Chiquita also made an internal commitment to ensure that all of
its farms met the social and environmental standards of S.A. 8000 by 2006 (which includes a
commitment to paying living wages), a goal it is on target to meet. 24 These changes have come
about as potential customers (grocery store chains) in Europe and the United Kingdom ask
questions about Chiquita’s methods of production, and many seek “sustainability” assurances or
inspection of farms before entering into long-term contracts. 25 Grocery stores are themselves
responding to pressure from European and British consumers, who are becoming increasingly
active on food safety and environmental issues. 26
As this example shows, the shifting social context has caused many global companies to pay
closer attention today to their social “license to operate.” One-half of Global 500 companies now
discuss social and environmental issues in their annual reports, in marked contrast with the
communication landscape ten years ago. 27 Most now have corporate social responsibility (CSR)
22

Indeed, the depth of the alliance today can be seen in the fact that Chiquita’s Social Responsibility
Report contains a certification from the executive director of the Rainforest Alliance. The 2002 Report
contains the following statement about Chiquita’s environmental practices:
Holding Chiquita Accountable for Environmental Excellence
The Rainforest Alliance and associated members of the Sustainable Agriculture Network have
been auditing Chiquita farms for more than ten years. We have seen remarkable progress
toward more eco-friendly production and healthier working and living conditions. During
2002, we once again assessed all of the farms against our rigorous standards. Many of the audits
were done without warning the farm managers in advance. I am pleased to report that all of the
115 farms were once again recertified.
We have reviewed the presentation of our audit findings and agree that this summary accurately
reflects the findings of our independent audit teams. On average, we gave Chiquita farms lower
scores this year as we continue to raise the bar for these farms that have long ago met the
requirements of the core standards. Our program demands continuous improvement. . . .
....
. . . Chiquita and the company’s farm managers have a record of compliance with our standards. We
are now challenging them to dig deeper into persistent and systemic environmental issues such
as worker health and safety, water conservation, agrichemical use and biodiversity protection.
Tensie Whelan, Executive Director, Rainforest Alliance, Holding Chiquita Accountable for Environmental
Excellence (July 3, 2003), http://www.chiquita.com/chiquitacr02/envirosocial_ 01a_1.htm (emphasis in
original).
23
See IUF, Colsiba and Chiquita Sign Historic Agreement on Trade Union Rights for Banana Workers
(June 14, 2001), available at http://www.iuf.org (select Chiquita from “companies” pull-down menu, click
“go”).
24
See Chiquita’s 2002 Social Report, available at http://www.chiquita.com/chiquitacr02/
envirosocial_01c_1.htm.
25
See id.
26
See Schurman, supra note 17, at 244 (stating that the cultural and political context in Western Europe
includes a “powerful cultural sensibility around food and a recent history of several serious food scares”).
27
See Cynthia A. Williams & John M. Conley, An Emerging Third Way?: The Erosion of the AngloAmerican Shareholder Value Construct, 38 CORNELL INT’L. L.J. 493, 544 (2005) (discussing statistics on
social and environmental reporting by Global 500 companies).
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officers and departments, and the CSR consultant industry is thriving. 28 Thus, as a response to
changing market conditions, well-run companies are paying sharply increased attention to human
rights and other social and environmental risks throughout their global value chain. And yet there
are more pointed reasons why boards are required to attend to stakeholder concerns and their
social relationships as a function of maximizing long-term shareholder value.

III. ALIEN TORT CLAIMS ACT LITIGATION
The Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA), enacted as part of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789,
provides subject matter jurisdiction to the federal courts to hear claims by “an alien for a tort
only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.” 29 This statute
thus allows claims by aliens (non-citizens) alleging violations of international law, even against
non-U.S. defendants, if there is a basis for asserting personal jurisdiction. The statute was
virtually ignored until 1980, when the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit decided
Filártiga v. Peña-Irala. 30 In Filártiga, the Second Circuit held that the ATCA provides federal
subject matter jurisdiction against a torturer, regardless of the nationality of the parties (if a basis
for personal jurisdiction exists). In so doing, the court permitted a case to go forward against a
former Paraguayan police officer, Americo Peña-Irala, who was visiting the United States, for
Peña-Irala’s torturing Joelito Filártiga to death in Paraguay, the plaintiffs’ son and brother. 31 The
Second Circuit held that:
Congress provided, in the first Judiciary Act, § 9(b), 1 Stat. 73, 77
(1789), for federal jurisdiction over suits by aliens where principles of
international law are in issue. The constitutional basis for the Alien Tort
Statute is the law of nations, which has always been part of the federal
common law. 32
The Filártiga line of cases did not concern companies until 1995, when the Second Circuit
held in Kadic v. Karadzic that a private defendant could be held liable under the ATCA as well. 33
Kadic created a doctrinal basis for bringing ATCA claims against other private defendants,
including corporations, for their alleged human rights violations abroad, and such claims have
proliferated. Approximately thirty-eight ATCA cases have been brought since Kadic. 34 The
claims at issue span a wide range of types of alleged violations including: environmental
degradation, 35 sweatshop labor conditions, 36 collaborating with the Nazis, 37 profiting from
28

See ECONOMIST, supra note 3 (begrudgingly recognizing the CSR consultancy industry).
Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
30
630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
31
Id. at 877
32
Id. at 885.
33
Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995).
34
See Beth Stephens, Upsetting the Checks and Balances: The Bush Administration’s Efforts to Limit
Human Rights Litigation, 17 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 169 (2004) (overview of ATCA litigation); Sosa v.
Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 712-13 (2004) (noting that the ATCA had been used only once until 1959).
35
See Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 303 F.3d 470 (2d Cir. 2002) (upholding dismissal of claims alleging
environmental degradation since environmental claims are not part of ATCA cause of action).
36
See Does I thru XXIII v. Advanced Textile Corp., 214 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding dismissal of
claims that alleged sweatshop labor conditions in Saipan’s textile industry for plaintiffs’ failure to provide
real names was an abuse of discretion given the plaintiffs’ objective fear of reprisals).
37
See Bodner v. Banque Paribas, 114 F. Supp. 2d 117, 127-28 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (denying motions to
dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction claims alleging Nazi collaboration against Jewish customers
29
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apartheid, 38 and corporate “entanglement” with repressive military or police. 39 Notwithstanding
this wide range of allegations, the international human rights causes of action recognized as valid
when brought against private defendants are much narrower: genocide, slave trading, war crimes,
and other such crimes against humanity. 40 To date, of thirty-eight cases brought against corporate
defendants, twenty-three have been dismissed, either because the underlying causes of action do
not meet the stringent requirements of the ATCA or because of the discretionary doctrine of
forum non conveniens. 41 Seven cases with corporate defendants have survived motions to
dismiss, 42 and the rest are in development (a number of which are pending decisions on motions
to dismiss). 43
The relatively modest success in withstanding motions to dismiss in these cases may not
seem to pose a significant enough litigation risk for boards of directors to pay attention. That
view does not give due regard to the trajectory of these cases since that developing jurisprudence
began fewer than ten years ago. Moreover, a decision of the United States Supreme Court last
term has heightened the litigation risk. In Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled
6-3 that the ATCA gives the federal courts subject matter jurisdiction to hear claims arising out of
“violations of the law of nations” and establishes a cause of action for torts in violation of
international law. 44 44 This decision rejected the narrower view of the ATCA that the underlying
causes of action must be established by federal statute before they are cognizable. The Court also
of French banks).
38
See In re South African Apartheid Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d 538 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (dismissing claims
alleging violations of the ATCA for doing business in South African during the apartheid regime as not
violations of international law).
39
See Bowoto v. Chevron Texaco Corp., 312 F. Supp. 2d 1229, 1247 (N.D. Cal.2004) (holding that
sufficient evidence precluded summary judgment and permitted plaintiffs to proceed against a U.S.
corporate defendant on the theory that its Nigerian subsidiary was acting as defendants’ agent or that the
defendant corporation aided and abetted in the human rights abuses).
40
See Elliot J. Schrage, Judging Corporate Accountability in the Global Economy, 42 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 153, 161-63 (2003); see also Cynthia A. Williams, Corporate Social Responsibility in an
Era of Economic Globalization, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 705, 750-71 (2002) (analyzing the procedural
difficulties facing ATCA claims, but discussing a number of cases that withstood motions to dismiss and
the causes of action that survived).
41
See Stephens, supra note 34, at 177.
42
Estate of Rodriguez v. Drummond Co., 256 F. Supp. 2d 1250 (N.D. Ala. 2003) (holding that allegations
that mining company acted in conjunction with Columbian paramilitary units to violate laws of war by
paying units to murder trade union leaders were sufficient to state a claim against company under ATCA;
and, on issue of first impression, that denial of fundamental rights to associate and organize may be
actionable tort under ATCA); Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d 289
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (ruling that campaign of ethnic cleansing against non-Muslim population of Sudan
constituted genocide under the ATCA); Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., Inc., 256 F. Supp. 2d 1345 (S.D. Fla.
2003) (dismissing ATCA claim against Coca-Cola Company and its Columbian subsidiary, but allowing
claim to go forward against Columbian bottler and owner alleging claims of conspiracy to commit murder);
Bowoto, 312 F. Supp. 2d at 1247 (allowing plaintiffs to proceed on their claims against an oil company for
aiding and abetting military killings in Nigeria); Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88 (2d Cir.
2000) (reversing dismissal on forum non conveniens grounds for alleged participation with the Nigerian
government in extrajudicial killing of an environmental activist), on remand, No. 96 Civ. 8386, 2002 WL
319887 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2002) (denying motion to dismiss amended complaint on the basis that private
corporations could be held liable for “joint action” with state actors); Bodner, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 127-28
(holding that subject matter jurisdiction existed under the ATCA, where plaintiffs alleged a French bank
had been complicit with the Nazi regime); Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal. 1997)
(denying motion to dismiss for alleged participation in government’s forced labor and torture).
43
See Stephens, supra note 34, at 177.
44
See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 719-20 (2004).
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recognized that the causes of action that can be heard under the ATCA will continue to be
extended (albeit with caution) whenever an international law norm becomes sufficiently definite,
universal among civilized nations, and obligatory. 45 This opinion clearly leaves open further
development of the ATCA jurisprudence, and so is worth considering in somewhat greater depth.

A. THE SOSA V. ALVAREZ-MACHAIN LITIGATION
The plaintiff in Sosa was a Mexican doctor, Humberto Alvarez-Machain, who was kidnapped in
Mexico by people hired by the U.S. government and brought to the United States to be tried for
his alleged participation in the torture and death of an American Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA) agent, Enrique Camarena-Salazar. 46 Camarena-Salazar had been captured
in Mexico, taken to a private home, and tortured over a two-day period in 1985. Based on
eyewitness testimony, the DEA believed that Alvarez-Machain was present during the torture and
participated in it. In 1990, Alvarez-Machain was indicted by a federal grand jury in the U.S.
District Court for the Central District of California and a warrant was issued for his arrest. The
DEA unsuccessfully sought the cooperation of the Mexican government in bringing AlvarezMachain to the United States for trial, and so it ultimately approved a plan to hire people in
Mexico to “seize” Alvarez-Machain and bring him to the United States. 47 One of the people who
participated in the “seizing” was the petitioner, Jose Francisco Sosa. Once seized, AlvarezMachain was held in a motel overnight in Mexico, then flown to El Paso, Texas, and arrested.
After unsuccessfully litigating the legality of the United States’ asserting jurisdiction to the
Supreme Court, based on “outrageous governmental conduct” and violations of the extradition
treaty with Mexico, Alvarez-Machain was tried in the United States for the underlying conduct,
and won an acquittal at the end of the government’s case. 48
Alvarez-Machain then initiated an action against Sosa, other DEA agents in Mexico and the
United States, and unnamed citizens of Mexico under the ATCA, and against the United States
government under the Federal Torts Claims Act (FTCA). 49 Eventually, the Ninth Circuit, sitting
en banc, held for Alvarez-Machain on both counts, finding that the ATCA both gives the federal
courts subject matter jurisdiction and provides a cause of action for violations of the law of
nations, and that the “clear and universally recognized norm prohibiting arbitrary arrest and
detention” meant that Alvarez-Machain’s arrest was a tort under international law. 50 As for the
FTCA, the Ninth Circuit held that since the DEA had no jurisdiction to hold Alvarez-Machain in
Mexico overnight, the U.S. government was liable to him for false arrest based on California
law. 51
The Supreme Court reversed on both counts, so Sosa can hardly be regarded as an unalloyed
victory for human rights and the rule of law. While the Court recognized that the ATCA
establishes a cause of action, and defined its present and future scope, it found no claim in this
case. On the ATCA claim, the Court held that the norm prohibiting arbitrary arrest and detention
had not yet reached the level of a jus cogens norm: one that is specific, universal, and
45

See id. at 731.
See id. at 697 (reciting these facts). Unless otherwise indicated, all of the facts described here are taken
from Sosa, 542 U.S. at 697-99.
47
See id. at 698.
48
See id. (quoting United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 658 (1992)). Sosa is thus AlvarezMachain’s second litigation in the Supreme Court.
49
Federal Torts Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1), §§ 2671-2680 (2000).
50
Sosa, 542 U.S. at 699 (quoting en banc decision of the Ninth Circuit, 331 F.3d 604, 620 (9th Cir. 2003)).
51
Id.
46
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obligatory. 52 On the FTCA claim, the Court held that the language of the FTCA excepted claims
arising in a foreign country; therefore, Alvarez-Machain had no cause of action against the U.S.
government for its torts committed in Mexico. 53
The holding of Sosa is troubling from a human rights perspective, since there was no dispute
that agents of the U.S. government participated in a plan to kidnap Alvarez-Machain because
their efforts at lawful extradition were blocked, hired Mexican citizens to force him into the
United States, and imprisoned him for almost two years on charges for which he was acquitted at
the close of the government’s case. 54 Still, it may be of some comfort to Alvarez-Machain that his
case will ultimately be remembered as clarifying the scope of the ATCA and providing an
important foundation for litigating claims against the United States and foreign companies in U.S.
courts for their alleged human rights abuses abroad. 55 By recognizing that the ATCA establishes
a federal cause of action based on evolving, international law norms of obligatory behavior, Sosa
allowed the continuing development of case law to inform thinking about companies’ human
rights obligations. Ultimately, though, Sosa’s most important contribution may be the Court’s
embrace of international law as a source of U.S. legal obligation, as against the “nationalist”
challenge epitomized by Justice Scalia’s dissent. 56
As a practical matter, Sosa and subsequent human rights cases may be less important than the
self-regulatory regimes discussed later in this Article in raising standards of corporate behavior,
although the two may reinforce each other. 57 The kinds of jus cogens claims that are cognizable
against private actors under the ATCA target only the most egregious behavior, such as genocide,
piracy, hijacking, summary execution, slavery, or war crimes, 58 while a slightly broader group of
claims can be brought against a company acting in concert with a state, if sovereign immunity
issues can be resolved. 59 Many companies have codes of conduct setting internal standards of
52

Id. at 732-33.
Id. at 712. The Ninth Circuit had concluded that the foreign-country exception did not bar AlvarezMachain’s claim because the decision to proceed by kidnapping was made by officers in DEA headquarters
in the United States. 331 F.3d at 638).
54
One wonders if perhaps, on viewing the evidence against Alvarez-Machain when being asked to extradite
him, the Mexican government reached the same conclusion that the federal court trying the case in the
United States eventually did, that there was not enough evidence to extradite (or convict).
55
When cases are brought against foreign companies for their alleged human rights violations abroad, there
will also need to be a basis for finding personal jurisdiction in the U.S. courts.
56
Sosa arose at a time when there was a growing academic criticism of internationalism from political
conservatives such as Curtis Bradley, Jack Goldsmith, Paul Stephan, and John Bolton. See Curtis A.
Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the
Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815 (1997); Paul B. Stephan, International Governance and
American Democracy, 1 CHI. J. INT’L L. 237 (2000); John R. Bolton, Should We Take Global Governance
Seriously?, 1 CHI. J. INT’L L. 205 (2000). In his dissent, Justice Scalia relied on Professors Bradley and
Goldsmith’s Harvard Law Review article, stating that “[t]he notion that a law of nations, redefined to mean
the consensus of states on any subject, can be used by a private citizen to control a sovereign’s treatment of
its own citizens within its own territory is a 20th-century invention of internationalist law professors and
human-rights advocates.” Sosa, 542 U.S. at 749-50 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation omitted) (emphasis in
original).
In defense of internationalism, see Harold Hongju Koh, International Law as Part of Our Law, 98 AM. J.
INT’L L. 43 (2004). For an excellent summary of the debate, see Anupam Chander, Globalization and
Distrust, 114 YALE L.J. 1193 (2005).
57
See infra notes 118-42 and accompanying text.
58
See Williams, supra note 40, at 764-66 (analyzing the jus cogens claims that can be brought against
companies).
59
See Stephens, supra note 34, at 173-82 (providing overview of ATCA litigation and the types of
53
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behavior that are more protective of human rights or the environment than the jus cogens norms
underlying these ATCA actions. 60 The articulation of corporate human rights responsibilities that
may develop from these cases, if any, is likely to be thin as compared with the more robust
conceptions embodied in voluntary initiatives such as the Global Compact or the extractive
industry’s Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights, or even stronger conceptions as
embodied in the U.N. Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and other
Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights. 61
The Sosa Court also emphasized that it left the door ajar to “further independent judicial
recognition of actionable international norms . . . subject to vigilant doorkeeping.” 62 It articulated
a number of principles in addition to the “clear definition” principle to limit its holding: that the
international law norm be clearly applicable to private actors; that claimants have exhausted
domestic remedies; and that claims do not undermine the Executive’s power to identify its foreign
relations interests in any given case as a reason to dismiss. 63 And, of course, Congress is free to
“shut the door to the law of nations entirely,” by amending or eliminating the ATCA, by
modifying or canceling any decision based on the law of nations, or by preemption. 64 As a result,
the central importance of Sosa in the corporate realm may not be so much what the Court did,
although that is clearly important, but what boards of directors may do in response. Still, in
rejecting the arguments of business lobbying groups to narrow the ATCA, the Court refused to
relinquish an important federal judicial power to hear international human rights claims against
global companies, and that continuing judicial power will work in tandem with new governance
regimes to keep human concerns salient for corporate decisionmakers.

B. IMPLICATIONS OF SOSA FOR CORPORATE BOARDS
Given the continuing vitality of ATCA litigation, directors’ fiduciary duties now include a duty to
be aware of human rights risks and potential violations within a company’s global operations and
to develop policies and management procedures to reduce the risks of such violations. Corporate
directors have a number of well-established fiduciary duties under state corporate law: the duties
of care, loyalty and full disclosure, and the duty to act in good faith. 65 As set out in In re
Caremark Derivative Litigation, part of the directors’ fiduciary duty of care is a duty to provide
oversight with respect to law compliance—a duty to have systems in place to reduce liability
complicity claims that can be brought).
60
There is a burgeoning literature on corporate codes of conduct as scholars have begun to understand the
devolution of power in the globalizing economy, and the new forms that regulation takes, including the
importance of self-regulation. See infra notes 116-28 and accompanying text. For some introductions to
codes of conduct, see Claire Moore Dickerson, Human Rights: The Emerging Norm of Corporate Social
Responsibility, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1431 (2002); Bob Hepple, A Race to the Top? International Investment
Guidelines and Corporate Codes of Conduct, 20 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 347 (1999).
61
See infra notes 130-39 and accompanying text (discussing the Global Compact and the Global Reporting
Initiative).
62
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 729 (2004).
63
Id. at 733 n.21.
64
Id. at 731.
65
See, e.g., Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85, 90 (Del. 2001) (describing the “triad of primary
fiduciary duties: due care, loyalty, and good faith”); Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 12-13 (Del. 1998)
(holding that general fiduciary principles requires honest disclosure under state as well as federal law). See
also Hillary A. Sale, Delaware’s Good Faith, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 456 (2004) (providing an overview of
directors’ fiduciary duties, as articulated in leading cases in Delaware, and discussing the evolving,
independent fiduciary duty of directors to act in good faith).
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risks from illegal activities by employees. 66 After Sosa, human rights violations are part of the
liability risks that directors need to consider, at least to the extent of ensuring that the company
has established appropriate information and reporting systems to assess risks of human rights
violations, as well as policies to address conditions that may give rise to such risks.
That the risk of ATCA litigation is significant was emphasized by representatives of the
business community in the Sosa litigation. Organizations speaking for the corporate community
used Sosa as an opportunity to ask the Court to narrow the reach of the ATCA, a goal that was
seen as important for business given the number of cases that have been brought against corporate
defendants since Kadic was decided in 1995. 67 Business lobbying groups representing “a
substantial proportion of all entities doing business in the United States and internationally,”
including the Business Roundtable, the United States Council for International Business, the
Chamber of Commerce of the United States, and the International Chamber of commerce,
collaborated in an amicus brief that emphasized what they viewed as the competitive
disadvantage of the ATCA for companies with a U.S. presence. 68 The brief identified ATCA
litigation as a “unique but significant risk” arising from the geographic breadth of claims“turn[ing] on conduct occurring in nations as diverse as Egypt, Nigeria, Papua New Guinea, and
Sudan,” the time-span of claims, from World War II Nazi slave labor claims to claims of
cooperating with the South African regime of apartheid to claims arising today, and the range of
types of actions that have been alleged to have violated the ATCA, including forced resettlement
of villages, cultural genocide, marketing unsafe products, or a failure to allow independent
unions. 69 Given the view of business amici that ATCA litigation presents a “unique but
significant risk,” it would be imprudent for directors to ignore the possibility of this risk as too
remote to consider in the board’s approach to risk management as part of their duty of oversight.
One response to this is to suggest that the duty of care generally has been eliminated as an
enforceable duty of corporate law as a result of the combination of: the business judgment rule,
which precludes personal liability for officers and directors taking reasonable care in making
business decisions; indemnification, which authorizes or requires the company to reimburse
officers and directors for most forms of personal liability; exculpation clauses, which companies
adopt in their articles of incorporation to eliminate a cause of action for breach of the duty of
66

See In re Caremark Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996) (Allen, J.). Caremark was a decision
of Chancellor Allen before his retirement, bringing up to date the Delaware Supreme Court’s previous
decision on law compliance, Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing. Co., 188 A.2d 125 (Del. 1963).
Although Caremark is not a decision of the Delaware Supreme Court, and so Allis-Chalmers is still the
authoritative precedent, Chancellor Allen reconciled the passive approach to law compliance that AllisChalmers seems to permit with the realities of global business and regulation forty years later, suggesting
that Allis-Chalmers “can be . . . narrowly interpreted as standing for the proposition that, absent grounds to
suspect deception, neither corporate boards nor senior officers can be charged with wrongdoing simply for
assuming the integrity of employees and the honesty of their dealings on the company’s behalf. A broader
interpretation of Graham v. Allis-Chalmers—that it means that a corporate board has no responsibility to
assure that appropriate information and reporting systems are established by management—would not, in
any event, be accepted by the Delaware Supreme Court in 1996, in my opinion.” Id. at 969 (citation
omitted).
67
See Stephens, supra note 34, at 178-80.
68
See Brief for the National Foreign Trade Council, USA *Engage, the Chamber of Commerce of the
United States of America, the United States Council for International Business, the International Chamber
of Commerce, the Organization for International Investment, the Business Roundtable, the American
Petroleum Institute, and the US-ASEAN Business Council as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Sosa v.
Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004) (No. 03-339), 2004 WL 162760, at **10-12.
69
Id. at **5-10.
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care; and directors and officers (D&O) insurance, which effectively shifts the financial risk of
malfeasance to an insurance company. Professor Sale takes this position, 70 while emphasizing,
with Professor Thompson, that federal securities law fills the void by requiring disclosure of an
extensive amount of information relevant to corporate governance. 71 Professors Black, Cheffins,
and Klausner have evaluated outside directors’ actual liability risks for failing to meet their
“vigilance duties” arising under a range of statutes, and found for actions taken in good faith such
risks are negligible, either under corporate, securities, environmental, pension, or other laws. 72
This component of directors’ and managers’ fiduciary duties is important even though it portends
no realistic possibility of personal liability.
First, a precondition for directors not to be personally liable is that they acted in good faith,
since the protective shields of the business judgment rule, exculpation, and indemnification are
only available for actions taken in good faith. 73 D&O insurance may be available to protect
directors against personal liability for actions not in good faith, in theory, depending on a
company’s policy. It would be hard to construe most standard, current policies to cover bad faith,
however, and explicit coverage for bad faith actions would be very hard to get. 74 The Delaware
courts are increasingly scrutinizing boards’ actions in the post-Enron era, particularly as the
federal government and the New York Stock Exchange seem to be encroaching on Delaware’s
predominant role as the arbiter of proper corporate governance. 75 As Professor Sale has argued,
70

See Sale, supra note 65, at 42 (“Although Delaware officers and directors previously had an enforceable
duty of care, the state legislature eliminated this duty—despite protestations to the contrary by the
Delaware judiciary—when it adopted the exculpation statute, section 102(b)(7).”). Professor Sale is not
suggesting that directors do not have a duty of care, only that it is unenforceable.
71
See Robert B. Thompson & Hillary A. Sale, Securities Fraud as Corporate Governance: Reflections
upon Federalism, 56 VAND. L. REV. 859, 872 (2003).
72
See Bernard Black, Brian Cheffins & Michael Klausner, Outside Director Liability, at ii (Social Science
Research Network, Working Paper No. 250) (extensively surveying cases and settlements, and finding that
“outside directors of U.S. public companies who fail to meet what we call their ‘vigilance duties’ under
corporate, securities, environmental, pension, and other laws almost never face actual out-of-pocket
liability” so long as they act in good faith).
73
See Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL), DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7)(ii) (2004)
(statutory power to exculpate directors not available “for acts or omissions not in good faith or which
involve intentional misconduct or a knowing violation of law”); DGCL § 145(b) (power to indemnify
directors, officers, employees and agents if “the person acted in good faith and in a manner the person
reasonably believed to be in or not opposed to the best interests of the corporation”); Emerald Partners v.
Berlin, 787 A.2d 85, 91 (Del. 2001) (“To rebut the presumptive applicability of the business judgment rule,
a shareholder plaintiff has the burden of proving that the board of directors, in reaching its challenged
decision, violated any one of its triad of fiduciary duties: due care, loyalty, or good faith.”).
74
A company can insure its directors and officers “whether or not the corporation would have the power to
indemnify such person against such liability,” here, for actions not in good faith. See DGCL § 145(g)
(2004). So whether a director would face actual, personal liability for a case of “utter failure” to consider
human rights risks as part of the board’s oversight duties would depend on the actual D&O policy of the
individual company at issue. Since it is unlikely that an insurance policy would be clearly drafted to insure
actions in bad faith, even this type of “unconsidered action as bad faith,” the theoretical risk of personal
liability remains.
75
See Robert B. Thompson, Delaware, the Feds, and the Stock Exchange: Challenges to the First State as
First in Corporate Law, 29 DEL.. J. CORP. L. 779, 779-80 (2004); William B. Chandler III & Leo E. Strine,
Jr., The New Federalism of the American Corporate Governance System: Preliminary Reflections of Two
Residents of One Small State, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 953 (2003) (views of the Chancellor and one ViceChancellor of the Delaware Chancery Court). A good example of this more searching inquiry is found in
the Disney litigation over the golden handshake of $140 million given to Michael Ovitz as he left the
company after fourteen unsuccessful months as second-in-command to his former good friend Michael
Eisner. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d 342 (Del. Ch. 1998). Shareholders brought
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the Delaware courts are giving new significance to the fiduciary duty of officers and directors to
act in good faith. 76 Additionally, plaintiffs have incentives to bring claims alleging a lack of good
faith in order to neutralize exculpatory clauses. 77
Not only are the Delaware courts emphasizing directors’ good faith, but it is precisely in
those circumstances where directors have failed to act that the courts are suggesting the
possibility of a finding of a lack of good faith. In Caremark, the Delaware Chancery Court
evaluated directors’ obligations to exercise care about law compliance within the company and
held that “a sustained or systematic failure of the board to exercise oversight—such as an utter
failure to attempt to assure a reasonable information and reporting system exists—will establish
the lack of good faith that is a necessary condition to liability.” 78 In the Disney Derivative
Litigation, the board’s failure to be involved in any meaningful way in the decisions to hire
Michael Ovitz and then to grant him a “no-fault” severance could constitute a lack of good faith,
if proven at trial. 79 As the Chancery Court put it, “[b]ecause the facts alleged here, if true, portray
directors consciously indifferent to a material issue facing the corporation,” 80 80 the directors’
actions would not be protected by the business judgment rule: “plaintiffs’ new complaint suggests
that the Disney directors failed to exercise any business judgment and failed to make any good
faith attempt to fulfill their fiduciary duties to Disney and its stockholders.” 81 81 By extension, an
utter failure to do anything to attempt to assure that reasonable information and reporting systems
exist with respect to human rights compliance would risk a court finding that the board or the
company’s officers had not acted in good faith, according to the analyses in Caremark and
Disney, and so could increase directors’ risks of personal liability. While the risk of personal
liability is still quite low, 82 an “ostrich-like approach” to known risks is one way to increase it.
claims of breach of the fiduciary duty of care and waste against the board for its having agreed to the terms
of Ovitz’s contract, which gave him every incentive to leave as quickly as possible on a “no fault” basis,
and for its decision to grant him a “no fault” resignation. Id. at 351-54. The chancery court granted
defendants’ motion to dismiss in its entirety in 1998. Id. at 365. In 2000, the Delaware Supreme Court
affirmed in part and reversed in part. Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000). Its reversal was narrow:
the reversal of plaintiffs’ claims for breach of fiduciary duty and waste were reversed “only to the extent
that the dismissal ordered by the Court of Chancery was with prejudice.” Id. at 267. So the Delaware
Supreme Court gave plaintiffs leave to amend, on the basis that plaintiffs might, theoretically, be able to set
out a waste claim, but did so with enormous skepticism. By the time plaintiffs were back in court on a
motion to dismiss their amended complaint, Enron had happened. Now the Chancery Court refused to
dismiss, heaping scorn on the Disney board for its “ostrich-like approach” to its duties. In re Walt Disney
Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275, 288 (Del. Ch. 2003). Plaintiffs had used the access to the company’s
books and records provided in Delaware law to develop a much fuller picture of the board’s abdication of
authority, so the change in outcome was not entirely due to Enron and Sarbanes-Oxley, but one also senses
some competitive pressure on the Delaware courts to maintain their pre-eminent position with respect to
corporate law.
76
See Sale, supra note 65, at 484-88 (discussing the developing meaning of “good faith” as an independent
fiduciary duty).
77
See Leo E. Strine, Jr., Derivative Impact? Some Early Reflections on the Corporation Law Implications
of the Enron Debacle, 57 BUS. LAW. 1371, 1385-86 (2002) (asserting that because of “exculpatory charter
provisions that exonerate directors for due care breaches . . . in the absence of evidence that the outside
directors had a financial interest in the underlying misconduct, they force plaintiffs’ counsel to challenge
the state of mind (i.e., the good faith) of the outside directors”).
78
See In re Caremark Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 971 (Del. Ch. 1996).
79
See Disney Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d at 291.
80
Id.
81
Id. at 278. At trial, the plaintiffs failed to substantiate their allegations, and the court ruled for the
defendants. In re Disney Derivative Litig., 2005 WL 2056651 (Del. Ch. Aug.9 2005).
82
See Black et al., supra note 72, at 9-10 (describing the “sliver” of duty of care liability risk that
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Second, a director’s fiduciary duty of care is not to act so as to avoid personal liability.
Rather, directors are expected to exercise due care, in this case to attend to risk assessment over a
wide range of issues, including “stakeholder” issues and global human rights, because it is in the
best interests of the companies they are guiding. One of the reasons for the combination of the
business judgment rule, indemnification, insurance, and exculpation, which together produce such
a low risk of personal liability, is precisely so directors will not be considering their own liability
risks when making decisions for the company, 83 as recognized by Professors Black, Cheffins, and
Klausner. 84
Third, boards are increasingly engaging in comprehensive, enterprise risk management as
part of their strategic thinking, and in reaction to the heightened attention to corporate governance
after Sarbanes-Oxley. 85 85 As a Conference Board report stated, “[r]ecent interviews with
business managers indicate that enterprise risk management (ERM) is gaining ground as a
comprehensive approach for evaluating activities and assessing the multitude of risks—including,
among others, strategic, operational, financial hazard, and legal—associated with conducting
business.” 86 The “unique but significant” risk of ATCA/human rights litigation 87 includes not
only potential liability, 88 but also the far more significant risk of damage to a company’s
reputation from credible allegations of human rights abuse. 89 As the business community’s brief
Caremark and its progeny gave rise to).
83
See Gagliardi v. Trifoods Int’l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1052 (Del. Ch. 1996) (“Shareholders don’t want (or
shouldn’t rationally want) directors to be risk averse.”).
84
See Black et al., supra note 72, at 63.
85
See Ellen S. Hexter & Stephen Gates, The Conference Board, Executive Action Beyond Compliance: The
Future of Risk Management, EXECUTIVE ACTION REPORTS (Jan. 2005) (reporting results of Conference
Board/Marsh Inc. survey showing that 91% of respondents (271 business leaders in the United States and
European Union) are positively disposed to or implementing ERM, and that Sarbanes-Oxley is one
explanation for this interest).
86
Id.
87
See Business Brief in Sosa, supra note 68, at 10.
88
One of the few cases to have led to an actual recovery to the plaintiffs was Doe v. Unocal Corp., 395
F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002), brought against Unocal Corporation for its alleged complicity with the
government in Burma/Myanmar for the use of forced labor, murder, and rape, and settled on April 2, 2005.
Those claims of complicity the Ninth Circuit had held were sufficient to state a cause of action against the
company under the ATCA, and on that basis the case was going forward. Id. at 946. The original complaint
alleged that plaintiffs and their family members had suffered a variety of human rights abuses, including
forced resettlement, forced labor, rape, torture, and murder at the hands of members of the Burmese
Government, and that Unocal knew or should have known of those abuses. Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F.
Supp. 880, 883 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (denying motion to dismiss for alleged participation in government’s
forced labor and torture). It was the “knew or should have known” complicity that the Ninth Circuit found
sufficient. Doe, 395 F.3d at 956. The terms of the settlement are confidential, but both the plaintiffs’
attorneys and Unocal posted statements to their websites that described the settlement as compensating
plaintiffs and providing funds to enable “plaintiffs and their representatives to develop programs to
improve living conditions, health care and education, and protect the rights of people from the pipeline
region.” See Press Release, Unocal Corporation, Settlement Reached in Yadana Pipeline Lawsuit (Apr. 2,
2005), available at http://www.unocal.com/uclnews/ 2005news/032105.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 2005).
See also Press Release, EarthRights International, Historic Advance for Universal Human Rights: Unocal
to Compensate Burmese Villagers, Press (Apr. 10, 2005), available at http://www.earthrights.org (last
visited Apr. 10, 2005).
89
Professors Black, Cheffins and Klausner look at market-based incentives for directors to exercise care,
even though they find vanishingly low liability risks for breach of “vigilance duties” under any body of law,
and conclude that directors’ concerns with their own reputation is an important market-based supplement to
the incentives created by legal liability. See Black et al., supra note 72, at 39-41. Here, we are emphasizing
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to the Supreme Court in Sosa indicated, ATCA “lawsuits almost invariably raise highly charged
allegations of human rights abuses, generate considerable publicity, and involve enormous
potential damages. The very existence of such lawsuits creates risk . . . .” 90
The risks to business reputation from credible allegations of human rights abuses create
incentives for companies and directors to consider these issues seriously, irrespective of whether
an ultimate finding of liability is likely. 91 Professors Kagan, Gunningham, and Thornton have
used both quantitative and qualitative research methods to investigate why firms comply with the
law. Specifically, they researched why many paper and pulp mills in various countries (Australia,
Canada, New Zealand, and the United States) met higher environmental standards than required
by law. Their results show top management in most of these firms are aware of, and affected by,
“regulatory, economic, and social licenses [to operate],” in which laws and possible enforcement
and penalties matter, as do the “enforcement” of various social actors such as investors, NGOs,
consumers, and community members reacting to information about companies and the
companies’ reputations. 92 Since directors and companies can suffer important losses of reputation
from social and environmental allegations, including allegations of human rights abuses, with
negative economic consequences to shareholders even in the absence of an ultimate finding of
legal liability, well-counseled board members are increasingly attending to the underlying
conditions in efforts to assess and mitigate those risks. 93
Conversely, social (including human rights) and environmental issues present opportunities to
well-managed companies. Recent meta-analytic research has shown that firms with better social
and environmental management practices outperform those with questionable commitments to
such issues. 94 Firms with responsible environmental policies, for instance, have lower stock price
directors’ concerns with the firm’s reputation, while recognizing that the two are related: Enron’s directors
may not be sought after to be on new boards given how badly the company did.
90
See Business Brief in Sosa, supra note 68, at 4.
91
See Clark & Hebb, supra note 16, at 17-24 (developing theoretical model of why global institutional
investors are paying attention to corporate social responsibility issues that is based on the importance of
corporate reputation).
92
See Robert A. Kagan, Neil Gunningham & Dorothy Thornton, Explaining Corporate Environmental
Performance: How Does Regulation Matter?, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 51, 77 (2003). For one example of
how these different licenses to operate interact to encourage companies to change their behavior,
irrespective of the ultimate outcome of litigation, see J. George Frynas, Global Monitor: Royal Dutch/Shell,
8 NEW POL. ECON. 275 (2003) (case study of Royal Dutch Shell and its reactions to Brent Spar and
litigation about its alleged actions in Nigeria, which is still on-going).
93
An example of this is General Motors Corporation, which has not one but two Corporate Responsibility
Boards for risk assessment and strategic thinking. As described in notes posted on the Internet of a
Business for Social Responsibility conference in November 2004, “The first CSR board is called the ‘CSR
Team’ and is comprised of directors from the functional areas for tax, audits, and communications. This
group looks at the impact of decisions on a company’s reputation. The second board is the ‘Corporate
Reputation Strategy Board,’ which conducts audits of all GM’s operating facilities to ensure that there are
‘no surprises.’” BSR 2004 Conference Session Notes, Corporate Boards and CSR, at 1 presentation of
Tanya Hayes, Manager, Corporate Responsibility, General Motors Corporation, available at
http://www.bsr.org/BSRConferences/2004/materials.cfm. It seems ironic that with two CSR boards, there
wasn’t someone who recognized GM may have competitive risk from failing to develop energy-efficient
alternatives, such as Toyota’s and Honda’s hybrids, which are doing quite well in the market. While GM
has, as of 2002, devoted $1 billion to developing fuel cell technology, it seems way behind the hybrid
market leaders Toyota and Honda. See Hart & Milstein, supra note 15, at 56 (discussing Toyota’s and
Honda’s hybrids, and the management process that led to them).
94
See Marc Orlitzky, Frank L. Schmidt & Sara L. Rynes, Corporate Social and Financial Performance: A
Meta-Analysis, 24 ORG. STUD. 403, 424-25 (2003). A meta-analysis re-analyzes all methodologically sound
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volatility and lower firm-specific risk than those with irresponsible policies, 95 just as firms with a
serious commitment to ethical behavior outperform those without such a commitment over the
long term. 96 While successful duty of care litigation challenging a failure to take advantage of
such opportunities to perform well over the long term is inconceivable, we assume that at least
some boards are thinking in those terms today because of the competitive disadvantage from
failing to do so.

IV. CHANGING INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR BEHAVIOR
Another reason that directors’ fiduciary duties to shareholders may require them to consider
human rights issues and other stakeholder concerns is that institutional investors, a critical class
of shareholders, are increasingly requiring such consideration. Since the authors of this Article
have recently written at length on this topic, 97 findings from previous literature are summarized
below in order to emphasize the shareholder-generated incentives for directors to pay increasing
attention to long-term social and environmental issues.
In the United States, institutional investor social activism is generally confined to socially
responsible investors (SRI) and to activist pension funds such as CalPERS and NYCERS. 98
Mutual funds, which own “a large fraction of corporate America” have been “relatively silent” on
corporate governance and performance, 99 and absolutely mute on social and environmental issues
(except where they were voting against shareholder proposals raising those issues). 100 Still, the
SRI portion of the market is growing rapidly 101 and is making progress raising some social and
environmental issues with companies. Public pension funds are taking the lead in identifying
prior studies of a given subject, using highly sophisticated statistical techniques. This meta-analysis by
Professor Orlitzky of the University of Australia and Professors Schmidt and Rynes of the University of
Iowa re-analyzes 52 prior studies and a total sample size of 33,878 observations.
95
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with companies and activism concerning long-term social and environmental risks, particularly in the
United Kingdom; and arguing that the corporate governance systems of the United Kingdom and the
United States are diverging as a result of greater institutional investor activism in the United Kingdom
concerning social and environmental topics).
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See id. at 545.
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See Gerald F. Davis & E. Han Kim, Would Mutual Funds Bite the Hand that Feeds Them? Business Ties
and Proxy Voting at 2 (unpublished paper, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=667625), (Feb. 15, 2005) (studying proxy votes of mutual funds, and finding a
“positive relation between the volume of pension business a fund company does and its propensity to vote
with management” on corporate governance issues).
100
See Williams & Conley, supra note 27, at 546 (citing statistics from the Investor Responsibility
Research Center showing that 55% of the largest mutual funds in America vote against all social and
environmental shareholder proposals; 15% vote against nearly all such proposals; and 30% cast
abstentions).
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environmental issues, particularly climate change, as a long-term risk to portfolio companies and
pressuring the Securities and Exchange Commission to require companies to be more specific
about the precise risks climate change represents to individual companies. 102 Recently CalPERS,
which is the nation’s largest public pension fund with a $183 billion portfolio, adopted a “Green
Wave” initiative to both mitigate environmental risk in its portfolio, and to encourage companies
to better assess climate-related risks in their strategic management, and to provide more specific
disclosure of those risks. 103
Moreover, shareholder pressure on social and environmental issues is likely to intensify as a
result of proxy voting disclosure, newly required since August 2004. 104 Prior to 2004, mutual
funds did not have to disclose how they voted on shareholder resolutions, so they could vote with
management, even when it was not necessarily in their shareholders’ best interests (i.e., voting
against corporate governance reforms or casting votes with management against assessing or
improving environmental or social performance in portfolio companies). 105 Since August 2004,
mutual funds have been required to disclose their votes on shareholder resolutions, 106 which
seems to be intensifying the conflicts—and progress engaging with management—these
resolutions can engender. For example, in the 2005 proxy season, for the first time a coordinated
effort existed to encourage individual investors to contact their mutual funds to ask the mutual
funds to support climate change resolutions at ExxonMobil Corporation. 107 While such an effort
could have occurred before, there would have been no way to know what the mutual fund did in
casting votes, and so no way to hold funds accountable. Another unprecedented development in
the 2004 proxy season was the public support of management for social resolutions at two
different companies. 108
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At Tyco International, Ltd., the resolution sought disclosure of how the company would
reduce its lead and dioxin emissions; the company supported the resolution, and it received a 92%
vote. 109 At the Coca-Cola Company, the resolution asked the company to prepare a report on the
economic impact of HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria on Coke’s operations; the company
supported it, and it received a 98% vote. 110 In conjunction with growing percentages of votes cast
for climate change disclosure resolutions—37% at Apache Corporation; 28% at Anadarko
Petroleum Corporation; and 27% at Marathon Oil Corporation—these developments indicate that
shareholder proxy disclosure is leading to interesting shifts in behavior and pressures on
companies that are among the factors causing companies to pay more attention to social and
environmental issues.
In contrast to the United States, where particular sectors of institutional investors (SRI
investors and public pension funds) are driving these developments, in the United Kingdom there
has been broader-based institutional investor concern for human rights and environmental issues.
Mainstream institutional investor trade associations such as the Association of British Insurers
and the Institutional Shareholders Committee have issued statements about the corporate social
responsibility disclosure they expect from portfolio companies, and that management’s failure to
appreciate corporate social responsibilities would be one reason for investors to engage in
discussions with companies or to intervene more dramatically by using voting. 111 Coalitions of
engaged investors have been leading efforts with NGOs to reform company policies on such
issues as labor conditions in companies’ global supply chains, child labor, government corruption
in the extractive industry, and climate change. 112 Britain was also an important center of
discussion for a joint U.K.-U.S. initiative among oil companies, institutional investors, and
NGOs, addressing the human rights issues that arise from security arrangements in the extractive
industry. 113 Moreover, new reporting requirements are to be implemented in the United Kingdom,
companies) that social or environmental proposals are withdrawn based on companies’ agreements to meet
SRI investors’ concerns, either to disclose specific information about various social or environmental issues,
or to adopt new policies to change the underlying substantive conduct. So, for instance, in 2005 a resolution
at computer giant Dell Inc. was withdrawn when the company agreed to improve by 50% its recovery rate
of used computer products over fiscal year 2004 (when 35 million pounds were collected). This withdrawal
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requiring boards of directors of British companies listed on the London Stock Exchange, the New
York Stock Exchange, or NASDAQ to produce an annual “Operating and Financial Review” that
identifies specific long-term risks from social and environmental issues and how the company
plans to address them. 114 (The European Union is implementing similar requirements in its
Accounts Modernization directives.) 115 London’s corporate governance standards have
historically been influential in other countries; and the London Stock Exchange is the world’s
most important market for global, cross-border trading. 116 Whether these particular expectations
about responsible corporate behavior will influence U.S. disclosure requirements and mainstream
institutional investor thinking remains to be seen. Still, these important developments provide
powerful reasons for directors to think more carefully, and broadly, about human rights and other
social and environmental issues as they identify the long-term strategic issues facing their
companies in the global capital markets today, particularly if British and European investors
become concerned about a lack of disclosure or strategic thinking about these matters among
American companies. 117

V. PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS AS INSTANCES OF “NEW GOVERNANCE”
A final factor that is causing companies and their directors to consider stakeholder issues more
carefully, in order to advance their shareholders’ interests, is the growth of “new governance”
regimes establishing norms of responsible corporate behavior that require such consideration.
Clearly, government regulation is an important factor shaping companies’ actions with respect to
a wide range of regulated behavior. 118 The recognized—and obvious—importance of regulation
gives rise to a concern among many commentators about the global reach of companies’ actions
in contrast to the domestic reach of legislation. This concern reaches its apex with respect to
international human rights. Given the absence of global government, globalization is understood
to have produced a regulatory vacuum, where no single state has the power to regulate the totality
of any global company’s activities. 119 Moreover, globalization is understood by some theorists to
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have undermined the capacity of governments to determine optimal law even in a purely domestic
context because of the concern that mobile capital and production will flee onerous regulatory
jurisdictions. 120 In either the “global regulatory vacuum” or the “domestic regulatory chill”
perspective, globalization is understood to have created a deregulatory legal environment.
Further examination suggests that these perspectives fail to capture the full range of types of
“regulation” found in the rapidly increasing integration of economics, technology, and
communication. Rich scholarship at the intersection of law and sociology decenters the state as a
locus of regulatory power in favor of a more nuanced view of various systems of control that
have an impact on conduct, including law, norms, industry and professional practices, markets,
and even architecture. 121 121 The “new governance” model of exercising power blurs traditional
public-private and state-market boundaries and introduces new categories of actors into the
regulatory process—collectivities of transnational civil society in partnership with
intergovernmental organizations or transnational associations of government employees, all in
partnership with private entities such as corporations, labor, and institutional investors. These
“governance” regimes exercise power through collecting and distributing information. As
described by Professor Ann Marie Slaughter, information can be power: by virtue of their ability
to “generate compilations of best practices, codes of conduct, and templates for everything,” the
governance networks’ “dissemination of information has played a far greater role in triggering
policy convergence in various issues than more deliberate and coercive attempts.” 122
Moreover, “new governance” theory emphasizes the importance of “simple” articulation of
norms. Years ago, Jürgen Habermas put forth the idea of a public sphere comprised of multiple
strands of civil society discourse that shape thinking and understanding of salient public issues. 123
Later conceptualizations of the public sphere have recognized that these civic discourses can
articulate norms that are potentially transformative. 124 Global corporate social responsibility
(CSR) or human rights discourses provide a good example of both the multiplicity of voices in
the transnational public sphere and the potential transformative impact of simple articulations of
norms. 125
There are a number of points worth emphasizing in this regard. First, scholars of regulation
have theorized that the category of regulation should be understood to include the norms and
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practices of society or communities, or the discourses of sub-sets of society. 126 Inherent in this
understanding is the recognition that norms, practices, and discourses can and do structure
behavior, much as regulation does. 127 With this understanding, the articulation of norms about
CSR or human rights by disparate participants in the transnational public sphere is more than
evidence of the changes occurring in society’s expectations of business. Rather, it can also be
understood as a type of quasi-regulation that can foster further changes in companies’ social
behavior, particularly if consumers, investors, or NGOs incorporate the norm as their expectation
of responsible behavior, thereby punishing companies that fail to meet the norm-based
expectation, just as they punish companies that fail to meet the expectations created by law. 128
Second, multi-national corporations, while certainly powerful entities in the globalizing
economy, are part of a larger discussion in the transnational public sphere about corporate
responsibilities. The power to define acceptable CSR practices (including human rights practices)
is fragmented, held in varying proportions by employees, unions, consumers, investors, top
management, governments, and NGOs, in addition to companies. 129 Many of the globalization as
deregulation theories assume that corporations alone fill the global regulatory lacunae, and
industry self-regulation is, in fact, an important source of regulation. 130 Yet even a brief
examination of the transnational public sphere suggests that the definition of responsible
corporate conduct is contested, and shifting, and that the power to affect that shifting definition is
diffusely shared. 131 Companies may have the most power in this discourse, but they do not have a
monopoly on this definitional power.
Third, it behooves directors to recognize, as many do, that even “voluntary” standards of
responsible corporate behavior are therefore taking on new meaning. Such voluntary standards
include the United Nations Global Compact, which identifies standards for substantive corporate
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behavior derived from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; the International Labor
Organization’s Declaration of Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work; the Rio Declaration
on Environment and Development; and the United Nations Convention against Corruption; 132 or
the Global Reporting Initiative, which identifies consistent, comparable standards for economic,
environmental, and social disclosure. 133 In important ways these emerging “voluntary”
substantive and disclosure standards are the new face of regulation in the absence of truly global
government, by becoming the norms by which companies will be judged by NGOs, consumers,
regulators, and communities.
These points have been amplified with specific reference to the Global Compact by
Professors Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall in their analysis of new types of power in
international politics. 134 First, Professors Barnett and Duvall identify the Global Compact process
as an example of global governance, since it “‘engages the private sector to work with the UN, in
partnership with international labor and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), to identify,
disseminate, and promote good corporate practices based on . . . universal principles’ that are
found in various UN documents.” 135 Second, by engaging in this process, a number of
mechanisms of “productive power” emerge, as identified by Professors Barnett and Duvall. 136
One type of power is the production of a “discursive space” in which various non-corporate
actors (such as unions and NGOs) are given legitimacy to comment on the right standards of
corporate behavior with respect to the panoply of human rights issues at the center of the Global
Compact. 137 These actors are invited into the discussion, which enhances their power to use moral
persuasion and other “shaming” techniques that are the essence of NGO power. 138 Second, the
Global Compact governance regime seeks to produce a “new kind of actor—the potentially
‘socially responsible corporation’—that may adhere to these best practices not because of the
manipulation of incentives, but rather because of a new self-understanding.” 139 To produce this
new social actor, the Global Compact has set up a learning network that will identify best
practices on various issues and communicate these practices to companies, hoping in the process
to change corporate cultures by the internalization of U.N. principles. 140 The Global Compact,
therefore:
illuminates the workings of, and connections between, different forms of power:
compulsory power because of the ability of nonstate actors to deploy shaming
techniques to alter corporate practices; institutional power because of the role of
the UN in establishing new rules that can constrain the behavior of corporations;
and productive power because of the attempt to help produce a new social kind of
corporate actor. 141
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Many global companies recognize that the norms these governance regimes are creating are
becoming the moral norms by which companies are increasingly being judged by consumers,
communities, investors, and civil society, whether a particular company has signed onto them or
not. 142 A narrow focus by a board of directors or its subsidiary’s board or officers on the
substantive standards of any one country’s domestic law may fail to meet the norm-based
expectations of a wider swath of important stakeholders, with serious consequences to the
company and to its shareholders.

VI. CONCLUSION
If there is a fiduciary duty to consider human rights, either present or emergent, its enforcement
will depend on a mixture of laws and norms. In the post-regulatory world of the new governance,
the question is less whether the relevant fiduciary standards are laws or norms but whether they
become enforceable in some meaningful way. “Law” presumes enforcement by the state; a
“norm” is separate from the state and its enforceability is less certain and more complex. In
small-scale societies, things like shaming, fear of bad reputation, and the possibility of needed
sustenance being withheld (as in a reciprocal economy) are all robust mechanisms for the
enforcement of norms. If state-enforced laws are to play a diminished role, as new governance
theory predicts, will global-scale analogs to these small-scale enforcement mechanisms be found?
This Article presents two possibilities. The first is investor enforcement or, more specifically,
institutional investor enforcement. This is a tangible, or “hard,” form of enforcement. Large
shareholders have the ultimate threat of selling and driving down share value (although the largest
find it difficult to sell without depressing the stock price before fully getting out). Falling share
prices get executives fired. Consequently, when institutional investors voice opinions about
corporate strategy, those same executives listen. If institutional investors choose to make strong
statements about human rights, action may well follow. The dubious part of this proposition—at
least in this country—is the “if”: despite a few highly publicized initiatives, there is still limited
evidence that mainstream American institutions are exerting significant CSR pressure on their
portfolio companies.
The second possibility is enforcement by such stakeholders as consumers, labor, and NGOs.
The first two groups wield “hard” enforcement power, at least in theory: consumers can refuse to
buy and labor can strike. But the case in practice is far weaker. With respect to consumers, all of
the CSR professionals interviewed have acknowledged that the “business case” for CSR—
presumably including human rights issues—is very difficult to make; at best, consumers may
factor CSR into their buying decisions as long as it does not cost any more. To take an extreme
example, there is no reason to believe that the Exxon Valdez disaster had any material impact on
the long-term profitability of Exxon or its successor, ExxonMobil. As for unions, strikes may be
“hard,” but in this country private-sector unions are withering, and a similar trend may be
inevitable in Europe as well. In the end, stakeholder leverage remains soft, dependent on such
traditional strategies as threats to reputation. Only time will tell whether these mechanisms of
norm enforcement can be effective on the global corporate scale.
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